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MIRANDA, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CONGRESS
David A. Strauss*
Are Miranda warnings required by the Constitution, or not? If
they are, why has the Supreme Court repeatedly said that the rights
created by Miranda are "not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution"?1 If not, why can't an Act of Congress, such as 18 U.S.C.
3501, declare them to be unnecessary?
These were the central questions posed by United States v.
Dickerson.2 It is not clear that the majority opinion ever really an
swered them. The majority said that "Miranda is constitutionally
based,''3 that Miranda has "constitutional underpinnings,''4 that
Miranda is "a constitutional decision,"5 and that Miranda "announced
a constitutional rule."6 But the dissent chided the majority for being
unable to bring itself to "come out and say quite clearly: 'We reaffirm
today that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda
warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United
States. "'7
To put the dissent's point more precisely, the Dickerson majority
never said that the Fifth Amendment is violated whenever a statement
obtained in violation of Miranda is admitted against an accused. 8 The
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B. Phil. Oxford, 1975; J.D. Harvard, 1978. - Ed. This Essay was prepared for a Symposium
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1. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 444 (1974)); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 307 (1985) (Miranda "sweeps
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself'; "Miranda's preventive medicine provides a
remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm"); Davis
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-91
(1993); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523,
528 (1987).
2. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
3. Id. at 2334.
4. Id. at 2334 n.5.
5. Id. at 2329.
6. Id. at 2336.
7. Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. The dissent's formulation is misleading because even under Miranda, what the
Constitution (arguably) prohibits is the admission into evidence of statements obtained by
958
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Court's earlier statements to the effect that Miranda establishes only a
"prophylactic rule" that "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself"9 seemed to preclude the Dickerson majority from
making that assertion. The dissent concluded that "[t] he Court there
fore acts in plain violation of the Constitution when it denies effect to"
§ 3501.10
At first glance, the dissent's logic seems powerful. The
Constitution protects certain rights. The Supreme Court's job is to de
termine what rights the Constitution protects. If an Act of Congress
infringes those rights, it is invalid. But an Act of Congress that does
not violate the Constitution must be enforced. If a violation of
Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution, how can the Court en
force Miranda in the face of a contrary Act of Congress?
In fact, however, the dissent's attack on the majority opinion is
mistaken - doubly mistaken - and its mistakes illuminate something
fundamental about constitutional law. The dissent is mistaken, first, in
its understanding of how courts develop the principles of constitu
tional law that they enforce. Miranda rules are "prophylactic" rules
that "go beyond the Constitution itself" in the sense that the Miranda
rules do not simply reflect the values protected by the Fifth
Amendment. The Miranda rules also reflect judgments about how
those values can best be secured, given the capacities and propensities
of the various institutions involved - in the case of Miranda, the po
lice and the lower courts. Virtually all of constitutional law, however,
consists of principles that are shaped in part by institutional judgments
of this kind. In Miranda, the Court did this shaping self-consciously
and more or less explicitly. But in principle, Miranda is no different
from any number of well-established rules of constitutional law that
also, in a sense, "sweep[ ] more broadly than the [Constitution] itself."
The dissent's second mistake is in its conception of Congress's role
in developing constitutional principles. When the courts determine
that the Constitution requires a certain result, it may follow that
Congress cannot disagree - but that conclusion need not follow. It all
depends (or at least it should depend) on whether Congress is in a betcustodial interrogation without warnings. It seems doubtful that questioning a suspect in cus
tody without warnings would violate the Constitution if the statements were never used as
evidence, unless the interrogation were in some other way abusive. See, e.g., Charles D.
Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1159 (2001). The
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment by itself does not forbid the government
to compel answers to questions; indeed the government often does so, when it immunizes
witnesses and requires their testimony before grand juries, for example. The Fifth
Amendment is violated when compelled statements are admitted into evidence against the
speaker in a criminal prosecution. The question about Miranda is whether it violates the
Constitution to admit into evidence, in a criminal prosecution, statements obtained from the
accused by custodial interrogation conducted without warnings.
9. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
10. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ter position to make the judgments, including the judgments about
other institutions' capacities and propensities, that are necessarily in
volved in elaborating constitutional law. This mistake by the dissent
reflects a common way of thinking about the relationship between the
courts and Congress. The common idea is that decisions by the
Supreme Court are either "interpretations of the Constitution" or
"decisions that Congress can modify. " (Decisions in the latter category
are sometimes called "constitutional common law. "11) The mistake is
in not recognizing that a decision may be both an interpretation of the
Constitution and a principle that Congress may modify.
The dissent's two mistakes are related. Part of what the courts do,
when they elaborate principles of constitutional law, is to make com
plex judgments of a factual nature about the capacities and propensi
ties of various institutions. Sometimes, Congress will be in as good a
position as the courts to make these judgments. When Congress is as
qualified as the courts are to make these judgments, Congress is enti
tled to play a co-equal role in elaborating constitutional principles.
Because the dissent in Dickerson (and others who echo its logic) failed
to understand how principles of constitutional law are developed, it
also did not understand how Congress should be allowed to contribute
to that process. This second mistake - to understate the proper role
of Congress in elaborating constitutional principles - is a characteris
tic of some of the Supreme Court's most prominent recent decisions.
In this Essay I will try to spell out, and defend, these positions.
Specifically, I will argue that it is misleading to ask whether Miranda
warnings are "required by the Constitution" or are mere "prophylactic
rules" that "go beyond" what "the Constitution itself" requires. It is
misleading because constitutional rules - routinely, unavoidably, and
quite properly - treat "the Constitution itself" as requiring "prophy
laxis. " In principle Miranda is, in this respect, just like many other
constitutional rules of undoubted legitimacy.
The conclusion that Miranda is as legitimate as other well
established constitutional principles does not entail, however, that
Congress is precluded from modifying it. Congress's role does not de
pend on a distinction between "the Constitution itself" (supposedly
untouchable by Congress) and "prophylactic" rules that "go beyond"
the Constitution itself (and therefore, supposedly, can be freely
changed or rejected by Congress). Nor does Congress's power depend
on a distinction between "interpreting" the Constitution (supposedly
the province of the courts) and "enforcing" the Constitution (suppos
edly the province of Congress). Congress's role in the elaboration of
11. This distinction between Marbury shielded constitutional exegesis" and "congres
sionally reversible constitutional law" is the basis of the important article by Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1975).
"

-
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constitutional principles is itself a complex constitutional issue. In
some areas, Congress can be trusted to superintend the development
of constitutional principles; in other areas Congress cannot be trusted
to do so. These are, in fact, familiar features of our constitutional or
der, even if we do not often describe them in this way, and even if the
current Supreme Court, in some of its recent decisions, has not prop
erly understood this aspect of the Constitution. Or so I contend.
I.

MIRANDA AS A PROPHYLACTIC RULE

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no person
shall "be compelled to be a witness against himself" in any criminal
case.1 2 If every statement obtained in violation of Miranda were "com
pelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, then Miranda
would follow from the Fifth Amendment, in a relatively straightfor
ward fashion.1 3 But the Court has not been willing to assert that every
statement obtained in violation of Miranda is compelled. 14 There are
hypothetical examples that seem to make such an assertion implausi
ble: a suspect, sophisticated about criminal law, only ambiguously in
custody, still in comfortable surroundings (in his or her own home,
say), who answers a single question asked in a surpassingly gentle
manner - that kind of thing. Even apart from such an extreme hypo
thetical case, it is possible to imagine relatively realistic situations in
which custodial questioning without warnings would produce answers
that we would not characterize as "compelled" in the ordinary sense of
that term. 1 5
Miranda is based exclusively o n the Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Why, then, does Miranda exclude statements

12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. Only relatively straightforward, because there would still be a question whether a
person is a "witness" in a criminal case when statements are obtained from him in an out-of
court interrogation and then admitted into evidence in the criminal prosecution. The defini
tive (affirmative) answer to this question is given in Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gate
houses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME

1 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965).

14. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 446
(1987), and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941, 951 (2001), for an argument that every
statement obtained in violation of Miranda (or equivalent safeguards) is "compelled" within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Rightly or wrongly, however, the Supreme Court has
not adopted this position.
15. The Miranda violation in Oregon v. Elstad was not too different from the hypotheti
cal, at least if the testimony of the officer is credited: the suspect was questioned in his home,
with his mother in a nearby room; it was not clear that he was under arrest; and, according to
the officer, the incriminating statement (which was not a confession to a crime but only a
statement that the accused was at the scene of the crime) was elicited not by a question but
by the officer's assertion that he believed the accused was involved. 470 U.S. 298, 300-01
(1985).
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that are not "compelled"? The basic answer is familiar by now. Before
Miranda, the courts had no choice but to conduct a case-by-case in
quiry into whether a particular confession, made in custody, was the
product of compulsion or was instead made voluntarily. (Formally the
question was whether the statements were "voluntary" for purposes of
the Due Process Clause, rather than "compelled" within the meaning
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, but those two notions can be equated
for present purposes. ) Those case-by-case inquiries, which had to con
sider all the circumstances surrounding the confession, were unsatis
factory in several respects. It is very difficult for a court, after the fact,
imaginatively to recreate the conditions that existed in a custodial set
ting. Even if the courts did have a full understanding of the circum
stances in which the confession was made, there is no metric for the
courts to use in determining whether those conditions were so coer
cive that they rendered the confession involuntary for constitutional
purposes. Because judicial determinations of voluntariness are unreli
able, law enforcement officers might be encouraged to try to compel
incriminating statements in relatively subtle ways in the hope that they
would later be able to convince the courts that the statements were
not compelled. And even if the courts were able to do a satisfactory
job of determining voluntariness after the fact, case-by-case determi
nations, tied as they are to the particular circumstances of each case,
give law enforcement authorities who want to do the right thing too
little guidance about how they should proceed.
Miranda was designed to address these deficiencies in the case-by
case approach. Whether Miranda succeeds or not is, of course, contro
versial. But the justification for Miranda is that - on balance - it
does a better job of enforcing the Self-Incrimination Clause than the
case-by-case voluntariness approach does. Miranda results in the ex
clusion of some confessions that are not compelled within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment. But on the other side of the ledger, Miranda
makes it more likely that the courts will exclude statements obtained
by compulsion that otherwise would go undetected. Also, Miranda will
deter law enforcement officers, to some degree, from trying to compel
confessions. The characterization of Miranda as a prophylactic rule
that "goes beyond" the Constitution seems to be a way of saying that
Miranda represents this kind of deliberate choice to exclude some
voluntary confessions, in exchange for the benefits of excluding or de
terring some compelled confessions that would otherwise escape de
tection.
The crucial point, however, is that every principle of constitutional
law reflects, implicitly, a comparable balancing of costs and benefits.1 6
No principle enforces itself; no principle can be perfectly adminis16. For another statement of the arguments in the remainder of this section, see David
A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988).
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tered. In a regime in which courts make case-by-case inquiries into
voluntariness, there are inevitably mistakes, in both directions: some
compelled confessions are admitted into evidence, and some voluntary
confessions are excluded. That is just the result of the fallibility of ju
dicial factfinding. If the Constitution itself requires that all compelled
confessions be excluded and all voluntary confessions be admitted,
then Miranda is, certainly, an imperfect fit. But the case-by-case ap
proach will also be an imperfect fit - and so will any other system.
To put the point another way, the idea that Miranda "goes be
yond" the Constitution seems to rest on the premise that a case-by
case inquiry into voluntariness is somehow natural, or is found in the
Constitution, so that any deviation from that approach is judicial law
making of questionable legitimacy. But the Constitution does not or
dain any particular institutional mechanism for ensuring that com
pelled statements are not admitted into evidence. The case-by-case
voluntariness approach is just one such mechanism. The Supreme
Court has to decide if it is the right mechanism. It will make that deci
sion by determining whether the case-by-case approach, on the whole,
strikes the right balance of costs and benefits. The decision to adopt
the case-by-case approach is, in this way, no different from a decision
to reject that approach in favor of, say, Miranda.
This point can be generalized well beyond the Self-Incrimination
Clause. Many established principles of constitutional law have the
same "prophylactic" character as Miranda. Take, for example, the
central feature of First Amendment doctrine: the principle that laws
that regulate speech on the basis of its content are presumed unconsti
tutional.17 The text of the First Amendment, of course, does not say
anything about content-based regulation; it just provides that Con
gress shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech."18 The pri
mary justification for the principle condemning content-based regula
tions is that such regulations are especially likely to be motivated by
government hostility to the message being conveyed. "[W]hen regula
tion is based on the content of speech, governmental action must be
scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been
prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's
views."'19 But not every content-based regulation is the product of
government "disapprov[al of] the speaker's views." A city might want
17. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (2000);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). The governing First Amendment princi
ples are actually more complex than this. For example, content-based restrictions are treated
differently if they restrict only low-value speech, or if they do not prohibit speech with a cer
tain content but only deny it a subsidy. But the presumption against content-based regula
tion is unquestionably a central principle of First Amendment law.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (quoting
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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to permit labor picketing near a hospital while forbidding anti
abortion picketing because it has made a reasonable - perhaps even
correct - determination that labor picketing is less likely to lead to
violence. But such a content-based regulation would be unconstitu
tional.20
In other words, the principle forbidding content-based regulations
is prophylactic. It forbids some restrictions on speech that are not
impermissibly motivated and, in that sense, do not offend against the
central values of the First Amendment. It does so because a case-by
case inquiry into the government's motives in every case involving a
regulation of speech is too likely to produce errors, and too likely to
give governments an incentive to conceal their true motivations - to
pretend to be suppressing speech for legitimate reasons while in fact
suppressing it because they disagree with it. Also, the prohibition
against content-based regulation is designed to take account of the in
stitutional limitations and propensities of judges.Judges themselves, in
evaluating restrictions on speech, might be influenced by the message
of the speaker involved. If they proceed case by case, judges might be
unjustifiably receptive to legislation that restricts speech with which
they disagree. A clear, categorical rule against content-based regula
tion makes it much more difficult for judges to be influenced, con
sciously or not, by such considerations.21
These justifications should sound familiar: they are the justifica
tions for Miranda, too. Case-by-case determinations are unreliable,
because judges will be too likely to make mistakes about the actual na
ture of a government action; a case-by-case regime gives government
officials too great an incentive to be conceal what they are doing. In
stead of proceeding case by case, the courts therefore establish a cate
gorical rule that will, inevitably, declare unconstitutional many gov
ernment actions that are in fact unobjectionable - if the facts could
ever be reliably found.The justification for that categorical rule is that
it does a better job of enforcing the underlying constitutional com
mand. All of these things are as true of the principle forbidding con
tent-based regulation as they are of Miranda. But the former is a well
established principle of unquestioned legitimacy. Is it a "prophylactic"
rule that "sweeps more broadly" than the First Amendment "itself"?
In a sense it plainly is. But the lesson is not that the centerpiece of
First Amendment law must be scrapped in favor of case-by-case in
quiries into legislative motive. The lesson is that the prophylactic

20. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
21. Justice Scalia, the author of the Dickerson dissent, gives this as a reason that courts,
in interpreting the Constitution, should try to eschew case-by-case approaches in favor of
categorical rules. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1179-80, 1182-85 (1989).
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character of Miranda does not make its legitimacy suspect in the way
suggested by the Dickerson dissent.
In Dickerson, the defendant and the United States, in explaining
why § 3501 was unconstitutional, argued that other cases, besides
Miranda, established prophylactic rules. One example that the gov
ernment offered was the elaborate doctrine, also developed under the
First Amendment, that defines the circumstances in which a speaker
may be held liable for defamation. In these cases, beginning with New
York Times v. Sullivan,22 the Supreme Court has held that sometimes
the First Amendment prohibits a state from holding a speaker liable
even for false and defamatory statements. (For example, a defendant
may not be held liable for defaming a public official unless the defen
dant can be shown to have acted with knowledge that the statement
was false or with reckless disregard of the risk of falsity.) The Court
has reached this conclusion even though, in the Court's own words,
"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."23
Why are some false statements protected by the First Amendment,
even though they have "no constitutional value"? The Court gave the
common sense answer in New York Times v. Sullivan itself: false
speech must be protected to some degree in order to avoid discourag
ing valuable speech. "[E] rroneous statement is inevitable in free de
bate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive. "'24 In other
words, given the inevitable imprecision of judicial factfinding, a regime
that protects only speech that has "constitutional value" will end up
deterring too much valuable speech. Some speech that has (in the
Court's own words) "no constitutional value" must also be protected,
because the disadvantages of protecting it are outweighed by the
gains.
Again this justification parallels the justification for Miranda. The
Supreme Court even characterized this line of cases as "extend[ing] a
measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood."25 The
Dickerson dissent tried to explain why the "strategic protection" of
New York Times v. Sullivan is different from Miranda's "prophylaxis"
by saying that the Court adopted the Sullivan rules "because the
Court . . . viewed the importation of 'chill' as itself a violation of the
First Amendment-not because the Court thought it could go beyond
what the First Amendment demanded in order to provide some pro
phylaxis."26 But this just asserts the conclusion. Sullivan requires that
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
24. 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
25. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
26. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2344-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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statements with "no constitutional value" be protected for "strategic"
reasons; if the notion of "go[ing] beyond what the First Amendment
demand[s] in order to provide some prophylaxis" has any meaning,
then New York Times v. Sullivan did it. Sullivan held - to use the
Dickerson dissent's terms - that what "the First Amendment de
manded" is precisely "some prophylaxis." Miranda held the same
thing about the Fifth Amendment.
II. THE MIRANDA EXCEPTIONS
Why has the Supreme Court not explicitly adopted this view of
Miranda? That is, why didn't the majority in Dickerson call the dis
sent's bluff and assert outright that the Self-Incrimination Clause,
properly interpreted, requires the Miranda rules? Apparently the
problem is the Court's repeated statements in earlier cases to the ef
fect that the Miranda rules "sweep[] more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself" and that a violation of Miranda does not constitute
an "actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights."27
The Court's statements to this effect uniformly occurred in cases
that recognized exceptions to Miranda or limits on Miranda's exclu
sionary rule - instances in which evidence would not be excluded
even though it was the product of a violation of Miranda. In Michigan
v. Tucker, 28 the Court allowed the prosecution to use the testimony of
a witness who was discovered only because of a violation of Miranda.
In New York v. Quarles,29 the Court held that a statement obtained in
violation of Miranda could be admitted under a "public safety" excep
tion. In Oregon v. Elstad,30 the Court held that testimonial fruits of a
Miranda violation (specifically, a suspect's subsequent confession, ob
tained in compliance with Miranda) could be admitted into evidence
against a suspect. In each of these cases, the Court noted that the
statements obtained in violation of Miranda were not compelled under
the case-by-case voluntariness approach, and the Court said (or sug
gested) that Miranda was a "prophylactic rule" that "sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself."31
The language in these cases is imprecise and a little misleading, but
in their logic, and their holdings, the cases are consistent with the basic

27. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 308 (1985).
28. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
29. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
30. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
31. Id. at 306. Harris v. New York held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda
could be used to impeach a suspect. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The Court did not explicitly rely on
the distinction between "the Fifth Amendment itself' and "prophylactic rules" in Harris, but
it later treated Harris as support for the idea that Miranda established such rules. See, e.g.,
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307.
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point: Miranda, although "prophylactic" in an important sense, is also
required by the Fifth Amendment. Miranda excludes some statements
that are not "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
- in itself an undesirable consequence, so far as the Constitution is
concerned - but it does so because, on balance, the benefits of the
Miranda rules, when compared with a case-by-case inquiry into com
pulsion, outweigh that undesirable side effect. In certain circum
stances, though, the comparison between Miranda and the case-by
case approach might come out differently; the balance of costs and
benefits might tip in favor of proceeding case by case. The Court rea
soned, rightly or wrongly, that cases like Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad
presented such circumstances. These circumstances called for refine
ment of the Miranda rule, but the refinement did not change the basic
character of the Miranda rules (with or without refinements) - that
they are both prophylactic and "found in the Constitution" in the
same way as other principles of constitutional law.3 2
In Elstad, for example, the defendant made an incriminating
statement without receiving Miranda warnings, but he made that
statement in circumstances that would not support a finding of com
pulsion in the case-by-case sense. The suspect was then warned and
gave a full confession. The Court treated the first statement as inad
missible; the question was whether the full confession was "tainted"
and therefore inadmissible, on the assumption that it was the product
(the "fruit") of the first statement. (The argument that the confession
was the fruit of the first statement is that the defendant gave the con
fession only because he thought the first statement had let the prover
bial cat out of the bag.) The Supreme Court held that the confession
was admissible. The Court nevertheless adhered to the rule that, in
these circumstances, the confession would not have been admissible if
the first statement had been "actually compelled" - that is, if an in
quiry under the case-by-case voluntariness approach had concluded
that the first confession was compelled.33
The Court reasoned that Elstad - and other cases in which the
Court created an exception to Miranda34 - presented a different bal
ance of costs and benefits from Miranda itself.35 It is true that, under
Elstad, many of the costs that Miranda sought to avoid will be in
curred. Courts will have to make a case-by-case inquiry into the volun
tariness of a statement obtained without warnings - the first state32. For a valuable discussion of the relationship between the Miranda "exceptions" and
prophylactic rules, see Susan Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030
(2001).
33. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
34. See, e.g., Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
35. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-09.
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ment, in the Elstad situation. That determination will be somewhat
unreliable, for all the well-known reasons that gave rise to Miranda.
This is a significant drawback of the Elstad rule. Elstad also gives the
police an incentive to try to coerce incriminating statements by subtle,
undetectable means, another of the problems Miranda sought to
avoid; if the police can do so, they can then, under Elstad, try to use
those statements, themselves inadmissible, to obtain an admissible
confession.
But the Court concluded that in the Elstad situation these disad
vantages are small enough to be outweighed by the advantages. The
unfavorable incentive given to law enforcement officers, the Court
reasoned, is not that great. The scenario to worry about is one in
which the police (i) withhold warnings; (ii) coerce a statement with
enough subtlety to avoid detection in a voluntariness hearing; (iii)
then give the suspect warnings; and (iv) use the previous unwarned
statement to induce the suspect to confess, or confess again. Elstad
creates a risk that such police conduct will occur, but the risk is less
than the risk of an undetectably coerced confession in the pre
M iranda regime, or so the Court thought. On the other hand, without
the Elstad exception, completely voluntary confessions would be ex
cluded. The Court concluded that in these circumstances the best bal
ance would be struck by admitting the second confession.
Whatever one thinks of the holding in Elstad, there is nothing in
consistent, in principle, between this approach and the view that
Miranda is required by the Self-Incrimination Clause. Miranda is re
quired by the Self-Incrimination Clause because that Clause has to be
implemented in some way; any method of implementation will strike
some balance of advantages and disadvantages; and Miranda strikes
the best balance in the circumstances presented by that case. In differ
ent circumstances, such as in Elstad (or Quarles, or Tucker) , a differ
ent balance might be best.
To make the comparison to the First Amendment once again, the
constitutional rules governing defamation of public officials are differ
ent from the rules governing defamation of private individuals, which
are in turn different from the rules governing defamation that ad
dresses no subject of public interest. These differences do not mean
that the rule of New York Times v. Sullivan is not a constitutional rule.
They just mean that the constitutional rule that applies in one set of
circumstances might have to be altered when different circumstances
arise - a wholly unremarkable proposition. The Court in Dickerson,
in trying to explain why Elstad and similar cases did not impugn the
constitutional basis of Miranda, said that those cases only illustrate
that "no constitutional rule is immutable."36 Perhaps a better way to

36. 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
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put it is that often constitutional rules are not simple but require a de
gree of complexity and refinement - a point that is obvious in many
areas of constitutional law. It may be that the Court struck the wrong
balance in Elstad, or in one of the other cases creating an exception to
Miranda (or, for that matter, in Miranda itself). But the fact that the
Court refined the balance it struck in Miranda, when cases presenting
different circumstances arose, has no bearing on the constitutional
status or legitimacy of that decision.
III. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
If Miranda is as legitimate a principle of constitutional law as any
other, what does that say about Congress's role in the development of
constitutional principles? The Miranda opinion itself famously sug
gested that the precise rules established by that case were subject to
being modified by congressional or state legislation, so long as the
legislation provided protection equivalent to that provided by the
Miranda rules themselves. The Court held in Dickerson that § 3501
did not provide equivalent protection but rather reverted essentially to
the state of affairs that existed before Miranda was decided. The dis
sent did not take issue with that characterization of § 3501, and the
Court's conclusion on this point seems clearly correct.
Several questions remain, however. First, if Miranda is indeed a
constitutional rule, how can it be replaced by legislation, even if the
legislation provides equivalent protection? Or, conversely, if the
Miranda warnings can be replaced by legislation, how can Miranda be
part of the Constitution?37 The short answer to these questions is:
even if Miranda is a fully legitimate principle of constitutional law,
why shouldn't Congress be able to replace it with some other regime,
if Congress's statutory alternative really does as good a job as the
Miranda rules themselves? Once we recognize that constitutional rules
often rest on a judgment about institutional capacities and propensi
ties - the reliability vel non of judicial factfinding procedures, the
risks of giving bad incentives to government officials, and so on there is no good reason to preclude Congress and the states from try
ing to solve the same problem that the courts are addressing - that is,
from trying to implement the Constitution with the best balance of
costs and benefits.38

37. Apparently, the Court itself began to speak of Miranda as an extraconstitutional
decision in part because of the statement, in Miranda, that Congress or the states could dis
place the Miranda rules by equivalent legisla.tion. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 n.l.
38. For a discussion of possible legislative responses to Miranda that reaches a similar
conclusion, by a somewhat different route, see Michael C. Dorf and Barry Friedman, Shared
Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. Cr. REV. (forthcoming).
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Once again the comparison to New York Times v. Sullivan is in
structive.While no one, as far as I know, has questioned the legitimacy
of Sullivan in the way that Miranda's legitimacy is questioned, many
people disagree with Sullivan on the merits. That is, they maintain that
Sullivan does not strike the best balance between protecting First
Amendment values and allowing states to protect people's reputa
tions. As an alternative to Sullivan, many have recommended, in par
ticular, a regime in which courts would determine whether an alleg
edly defamatory statement was false and, if it was, either require the
speaker to publish a retraction or impose strictly limited damages.39
The argument is that such an alternative would avoid much of the
chilling effect that is Sullivan's principal concern while reducing unre
dressed damage to reputation.
If such a scheme (or some other alternative) did indeed strike as
good or better a balance than Sullivan, there would be no good reason
for the Court to reject a statute that adopted it. But no one questions
the constitutional status of Sullivan. Analogously, one need not ques
tion the constitutional status of Miranda to conclude that a legislature
could provide a substitute for Miranda, if the substitute struck as good
a balance as Miranda does between the competing interests involved
in custodial interrogation.
But who decides whether the alternative strikes as good a balance
as Miranda? That is the more fundamental question. More precisely,
how much deference should the courts give to a legislature's determi
nation that its alternative is equally effective? This question was not
really raised by Dickerson, because, as I said, it was quite clear that §
3501 was not a serious effort to accomplish what Miranda sought to
accomplish but was rather just an effort to overrule Miranda. But the
question
is
important
in
practical
terms
in
case
Congress, or a state legislature, responds to Dickerson by enacting a
statute that does seem more genuinely designed to take the Miranda
Court's invitation seriously. In addition, this question highlights the
relationship between Dickerson and some of the Court's most impor
tant recent decisions - decisions that raised the question of how much
deference the courts should give to Acts of Congress that rest on an
assessment of facts or institutional circumstances that is different from
the Court's own.40
The Supreme Court's most significant recent statement on this is
sue is City of Boerne v. Flores,41 which involved the constitutionality of
39. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 771-74
(1985) (White, J., concurring).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
41. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). RFRA, a federal
statute, prohibited any state or federal law from imposing a "substan
tial[ ] burden[ ]" on the exercise of religion unless the law was the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.42 Congress's
admitted reason for enacting RFRA was that it disagreed with the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,43 which
held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not
forbid Congress or the states from enacting laws that impose burdens
on religious practices, so long as those laws do not single out religion
and are not motivated by hostility toward religion. Congress sought to
justify RFRA as an exercise of its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the power "to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."44 (The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to
incorporate the First Amendment's protection of the "free exercise of
religion.")
In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitu
tional. The Court reasoned that Congress's power "to enforce" the
Fourteenth Amendment did not include the power "to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation."45 Rather, the Court said,
Section 5 gives Congress only the power to remedy what the Court
would determine to be violations of the Constitution. The Court then
concluded that RFRA exceeded the scope of Congress's remedial
power because there was a lack of "congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end."46 RFRA, the Court said, "is so out of proportion
to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be under
stood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional be
havior. "47
The central distinction that the Court drew in City of Boerne - be
tween "enforc[ing] a constitutional right" and "determin[ing] what
constitutes a constitutional violation"48 - is, in an important way, in
consistent with Dickerson. In fact, that very distinction is the basis of
the Dickerson dissent. The Miranda rules are, as the Court has said
many times, a way of "enforc[ing the] constitutional right" to be free
from compelled self-incrimination. Therefore, under the logic of City

42. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub.
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1994)).
43. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
45. 521 U.S. at 519.
46. Id. at 520.
47. Id. at 532.
48. Id. at 519.

L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
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of Boerne
and according to the decisions that describe the Miranda
warnings as "prophylactic" rules that "sweep more broadly than" the
Self-Incrimination Clause
Miranda does not "determine what con
stitutes a constitutional violation. " But that means, according to City
of Boerne, that Miranda falls into Congress's province, not the
Court's. Dickerson held otherwise.
The problem with City of Boerne
and the reason Dickerson is
correct - is that there is no sharp distinction between interpreting and
enforcing the Constitution. Consider again the principle that content
based regulation of speech is presumptively unconstitutional. Does
that principle just "enforce" the First Amendment, by helping prevent
improperly motivated legislation? Or is it an interpretation that "de
termines the content" of the First Amendment? The answer is that it
is both. Much of what the courts do, when they "interpret" the Consti
tution and "determine its content," is to design principles that "en
force" the underlying constitutional requirement by preventing or
remedying actions that threaten constitutional values.
The decision in Employment Division v. Smith reflected a judg
ment that case-by-case inquiries into government motives will ade
quately protect the free exercise of religion. That judgment was based
in part on a view about the proper understanding of the First
Amendment phrase "the free exercise of religion." But, like Miranda,
Smith was based on a judgment about the courts' institutional capacity
to detect constitutional violations through a case-by-case inquiry, and
on a judgment about the likelihood that the states and the other
branches of the federal government would try to evade constitutional
requirements (consciously or not) by disguising, as neutral, legislation
that was in fact improperly motivated. Those kinds of judgments are
involved in "enforcing" the Constitution, a power that City of Boerne
concedes to Congress; they are also involved in interpreting the
Constitution, in Miranda, Smith, and many other cases. It is simply not
possible to draw a sharp distinction between the two; "enforcement" is
inextricably, and properly, a part of "interpretation."
This does not answer the question of how far Congress may go in
second-guessing the Court's interpretations. The fact that there is no
clear distinction between "enforcement" and "interpretation" does
not mean that RFRA was constitutional, any more than it means that
§ 3501 was constitutional. But it does, at least, pose the right question:
how much deference should Congress's judgments be given? The
Court in City of Boerne was explicitly concerned that, if Congress had
the power to "interpret" as well as "enforce" the Constitution, there
would be no effective limit on Congress's power.49 That concern is ob
viously legitimate. The problem is that the device that City of Boerne
-

-

-

49. Id. at 529.
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chose to limit Congress's power - a sharp distinction between inter
pretation and enforcement - does not hold up.
How much deference should Congress be given, then, when it sec
ond-guesses the courts' judgment about what is needed adequately to
protect constitutional rights? The answer should depend, not on a
conceptual distinction between interpretation and enforcement, but
on an assessment of Congress's own capacities and propensities. For
example, it has become a fixed point of constitutional law that popu
larly elected bodies cannot be fully trusted to regulate freedom of ex
pression, because they are too likely to be tempted to limit speech that
they dislike.so Similarly, legislation that is hostile to certain kinds of
minority groups - "discrete and insular" minorities, in the canonical
formulation - is more closely reviewed by the courts, partly on the
ground that those groups are not able fully to protect themselves in
the legislative process. s1 For several decades after the New Deal, the
Supreme Court seemed to have settled on the opposite principle when
reviewing federal legislation that threatened state prerogatives. The
idea was that states are able adequately to protect themselves in
Congress, so when only federalism was at stake, Congress's determina
tions could be trusted completely.s2 Recently, in City of Boerne and
other cases, the Court has reconsidered this view; the Court's declara
tion that it will review acts of Congress for "congruence and propor
tionality" reflects this new distrust of congressional judgments in this
area. The Court's new solicitude for states' prerogatives can certainly
be criticized, but at least it is potentially directed to the right question:
whether, and to what extent, Congress can be trusted to make the
judgments involved in the inextricably entwined tasks of interpreting
and enforcing the Constitution.
To what extent should the courts trust the legislative judgments
underlying any successor to § 3501 that might try to redefine the rights
of suspects subjected to custodial interrogation? Statutes that limit the
rights of criminal suspects do not receive a full measure of deference
from the courts. The Supreme Court has not been very explicit about
this, but it shows little tendency to defer to legislative assessments of

50. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST ch. 5 (1980).
51. The idea that legislation must be more closely scrutinized by the courts when it is
directed at "discrete and insular minorities" is, of course, derived from United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). For criticism, see, for example, Bruce A.
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
52. The best-known statement of this position is Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safe
guards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The Supreme Court explicitly adopted this ap
proach in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 & n.
11 (1985). See also generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (arguing that informal political
institutions protect federalism).
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the extent to which criminal suspects should be protected by the Bill
9f Rights.53 The courts have never fully articulated the reason for this
lack of deference, but, by analogy to other constitutional rights, the
reason seems to be that in this area, public hostility to the rights in
volved might improperly skew a legislature's judgment. Were Con
gress to respond to Dickerson by providing what purported to be an
adequate substitute for Miranda, the courts could properly undertake
a careful review of the justifications advanced for the legislation to en
sure that it was indeed based on a convincing assessment of institu
tional realities. There seems to be no reason, for example, to review
such a law under a standard less stringent than that which the Court
applies when it is dealing with regulations that are specifically directed
to speech but are not based on the content of speech;54 perhaps an
even more rigorous standard might be appropriate. The approach the
Court takes should acknowledge that Congress may have superior
competence to make the institutional judgments that are involved in
deciding what regime should govern custodial interrogation, while still
making sure that the courts play their historic role of protecting the
rights of criminal suspects.
But the justification for this relatively intrusive judicial review is
not that Congress has no role to play in defining constitutional rights.
On the contrary: once constitutional rights are understood, as they
must be, as partly but inevitably "prophylactic" in nature, there should
be no objection, in principle, to Congress's playing a role in their
elaboration. Dickerson is best justified on the ground that constitu
tional principles - full-fledged, fully legitimate constitutional princi
ples - are routinely "prophylactic" in the way Miranda is. That is why
the Court in Dickerson was justified in declaring § 3501 unconstitu
tional. But the other side of that coin is that constitutional interpreta
tion will often rest on the kinds of judgments that Congress is in a
good position to make. When it does, Congress's determinations are
entitled to an appropriate degree of deference. United States v.
Dickerson, which is on the surface a ringing reaffirmation of judicial
supremacy, contains the seeds of a more full acknowledgement that
both the courts and Congress play a legitimate role in the interpreta
tion of the Constitution.

53. For example, the Court has invalidated federal statutes that authorized searches that
the Court considered unreasonable, without indicating that the legislative judgment was en
titled to deference. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
54. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Syst., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 192-96 (1997).

